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Introduction
The Vietnam War has always provoked debate amongst scholars, citizens, and
politicians. Most often, this debate centers around the Johnson Administration of the 1960s;
historically, United States involvement in Vietnam began much earlier, with the Truman
Administration, and expanded more and more under his successors. Particularly under the
leadership of Truman and Eisenhower, American policymakers pursued conflicting goals in
Indochina, and the failure of American policy objectives in the region became clear long before
the Johnson era. With the mounting power of the Soviet Union after World War II, the world
became polarized, divided between communism on one side and capitalism on the other. Many
American politicians believed that the Kremlin directed all communists; similarly, many SinoSoviet leaders believed that the United States controlled all capitalists. The monolithic view of
communism in the Free World was matched by a monolithic view of capitalism in the Soviet
sphere. The ideological conflict also centered on a rivalry between the democracy and
authoritarianism. The United States and other Free World nations depicted themselves as great
advocates of egalitarian principles and individual rights, while they portrayed the Communist
bloc as chiefly concerned with the predominance of the state over the value of the individual.
This multi-faceted polarization amounted to a Cold War between the Free World and the
Communist Bloc lasting well into the 1980s. It was described as cold in its avoidance of total
war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but undoubtedly, proxy wars in smaller
countries occurred quite frequently.

The war between Vietnam and France provides an example of one of these proxy wars.
The war, however, involved not only France and Vietnam, and it was also not as clear-cut as
friend versus foe. Vietnam itself was divided between a coalition of nationalists, communists,
and non-communists in the North and the French-controlled South. Some nationalists certainly
resided in the South, but the area was still under French hegemony. At the start of the war, the
French had the upper hand in manpower and weaponry, but this all changed with the fall of
China and the subsequent deterioration of effective French leadership. With the defeat of Chiang
Kai-shek’s regime in October 1949, the communists, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung,
ascended to power. Chiang’s regime, exiled to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), continued to
receive American support, while Mao’s mainland regime obtained support from the Soviets.
Mao’s ascension also allowed the North Vietnamese to receive direct support from their Chinese
neighbor to the North. In response, the United States, on May 1, 1950, began monetarily aiding
the French in their effort against the Vietnamese nationalists, initially committing ten million
dollars.1 This aid only expanded exponentially as time went on, with ever-increasing American
involvement, at least financially each and every year.
Already a belligerent in the war in Korea, the United States did not want to involve
ground troops in another proxy war in Asia. On the other hand, American officials wanted to
ensure that Vietnam would not suffer the same fate as China and fall to communism. To
maintain these goals, the United States continued increasing their aid to the ever more
floundering French. With aid from China paralleling United States aid to the French, the Viet
Minh, Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist, guerrilla force headquartered in the North, had gained
efficiency, weaponry, and training, transforming them from “peasants by day, [into] snipers,
1
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guerrilla fighters, and saboteurs by night.”2 Though the French still maintained ground forces in
greater numbers than their Viet Minh counterparts, they were lacking in their organization,
morale, and leadership. The weak South Vietnamese government was another disadvantage.
Chiefly led by Emperor Bao Dai, the government lacked motivated leaders, and the population
suffered from great apathy, often deemed “fence-sitters” by American and French officials alike.
Starting in 1952 and continuing throughout their involvement in the region, the United States
was acutely aware of all these disadvantages but remained convinced that its financial and
technological aid could save Southeast Asia from communist takeover. In reality, the United
States could not prevent the looming intervention they would eventually enter into. Funding the
majority of the French effort, in fact, guaranteed their eventual intercession in the region. The
United States essentially tried to avoid direct intervention and stem the spread of communism
simultaneously, when, in reality, one goal was not feasible without the other. As the inability of
achieving a French victory became clear towards the end of 1953, the United States remained
committed to delaying the entrance of American troops unless it was under united action.
Ultimately, the United States would only commit to full involvement in an ideologically based
conflict in the region, while the rest of the world saw the issue from a more practical standpoint.
Undeniably, Southeast Asia was valuable strategically, containing numerous natural resources
and occupying a decisive location. The United States recognized this and wanted to preserve
control in the region to guarantee success in Japan and other Asian territories in the Free World.
Other nations, however, such as England and France, while acknowledging the tactical value of
Indochina, also analyzed their own nation’s floundering public opinion on the Indochina War
2
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and refused to commit themselves for any further involvement. American policymakers virtually
ignored this issue, as is clear from the implications of public opinion in the 1960s, when the
United States was fully involved in a war not between communism and capitalism, but between
the United States and Vietnam. The Vietnam War that would occur in the late 1960s and early
1970s was essentially determined by the escalations from 1952 to 1954.
Modern scholars have disagreed on the United States’ role during these three
monumental years. Some place the blame clearly on one group, such as French or American
officials, while others offer more unbiased views of the overall situation at the time. Placing the
blame for the conflict on one side or another will not alter the effects that European and
American intervention have had in Vietnam. It is better to look at all the players in the conflicts
through clear glass and then make a final assessment considering all the factors involved.
Archimedes L.A. Patti, in his book, Why Vietnam? Prelude to America’s Albatross,
occupied a position somewhere in the middle. He equally criticizes the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations, in their monolithic vision of the world, for their ignorance of Vietnamese
nationalism and desire for independence. This is in fact his most apparent and harsh criticism,
taking a tough stand against the United States, proclaiming, “Despite our good intentions, in
holding that our form of democracy is the only answer, we fail to accept for other peoples the
basic tenet of democracy—the right to self-determination.”3 Presenting impartial views of each
administration, Patti proves to be most critical of United States policy in general. For example,
unlike the French, who admitted their desires for French hegemony in Indochina, the Americans
claimed they were committed to self-determination while gradually increasing their level of
intervention in the region. This gradual increase was all in the name of halting the spread of
3
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communism. The French, on the other hand, were chiefly concerned with the prestige of the
French Union, not the power of the Free World. American policymakers did not take this
important difference fully into account, falsely believing that they could avoid direct intervention
and communism’s spread in the region by financially and technically backing the French.
Nicholas Tarling’s History of Southeast Asia offers another unbiased perspective. Though
only an overview, Tarling offers a concise analysis of United States involvement from 1952 to
1954. He focuses his attention on the Eisenhower administration, for more involvement and aid
occurred under this administration than under that of his predecessor, Harry Truman. Truman
began the aid programs, but Eisenhower and his advisors, particularly Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles, truly developed them. Tarling also provides information on the political structures
of the North and South, with the many contrasts between them. Analyzing the differences
between each player involved in the conflict, as Tarling did, is certainly essential and incredibly
helpful in developing a broader picture of the situation. Focusing on Eisenhower over Truman,
however, is not as effective, for Truman began the trends that Eisenhower followed and
enlarged. Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery’s text is yet another that provides an overview of
the events in the region. Focusing on a large time frame, from 1858 to 1954, there is not much
information in their text on 1952 to 1954, but the little information contained there is quite
balanced. They also provide several useful maps throughout their book. Furthermore, Jean
Sainteny’s memoir on Ho Chi Minh, though expected to be quite one-sided and leaning toward
the French, is actually rather impartial. He did exhibit some French prejudices, arguing, for
instance, that French establishments created stability within the weak infrastructure of South
Vietnam. Though this is partially true, Sainteny ignores the barrier that French establishments
often created against Indochinese independence. He also possesses a favorable opinion of Ho Chi
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Minh, establishing him as Vietnam’s symbol for independence. Though an instrument of French
diplomacy, he understood the emblematic value Ho Chi Minh held in the region. Without the
symbolism and power of Ho Chi Minh, the nationalist leaning of the Indochinese would not have
been nearly as strong. Overall, despite slight inclinations towards one side or a certain camp,
Tarling and Sainteny both occupy the latter position.
Other writers’ books have a more refined focus, such as those of Jeff Broadwater and Ted
Morgan. Broadwater focuses on Eisenhower’s anticommunist views but mainly on the domestic
front, analyzing, for example, how Eisenhower and his executive wrested control from Senator
Joseph McCarthy. Despite this limit, the overall anticommunist outlook of the time, an outlook
that affected United States-Indochina policy, shines through. Broadwater also seems more
critical of Eisenhower’s advisors, particularly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, than
Eisenhower himself, a critique many other scholars shared. Truman and his advisors, however,
had started the tendency towards United States intervention; the Eisenhower administration
merely brought the trends to their full fruition. Ted Morgan’s book on the battle of Dien Bien
Phu is not focused on domestic policy but, instead, military policy. He discusses the military
events in the region leading up to the decisive battle, and he also provides overviews of Ho Chi
Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap’s backgrounds, something most other writers largely ignore.4 His
text is useful in its well-rounded assessment despite its nominally minimal focus. The texts of
both Broadwater and Morgan, though focusing on specific policy aspects, manage to
communicate various larger ideas such as the effects of anticommunism on Eisenhower’s
policies as well as the larger implications of the loss at Dien Bien Phu. For instance, without
anticommunist sentiment, particularly the stigma of Truman’s loss of China, the reality of United
4
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States intervention would have been questionable, for preventing the spread of communism was
the main rationale for increasing American aid efforts. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu
illustrated how these aid efforts were not enough to impede a Viet Minh victory. Clearly, the
United States could not avoid direct intercession if they wished to preserve Free World interests
in the region.
Nicola Cooper is another writer with a narrower focus, centering on the French press and
their depictions of the war in Indochina. His analysis of various documents from the time period
are quite useful in learning the shifts in French morale on the home front and at war, but overall,
they do not offer much that was pertinent to the focus of this paper. The French article proves
much more useful in terms of analyzing the French views on United States involvement in the
region. For instance, these include the development of the “withdrawal psychology” in France
throughout the early 1950s that opposed further United States and French intervention in the
region. Though certainly biased towards the French position, the article offers a different opinion
than the other English sources consulted and thus gives more developed insight into the true
nature of French public opinion.
Finally, the two remaining books, by William J. Duiker and Weldon Brown, agree that
United States officials were overly optimistic in their assessment of the conditions in Vietnam at
the time. As Brown articulates, “Excessive optimism followed by contradictory failure was to be
common practice in the story of Vietnam.”5 In attempting to conform to the ideal set forth by
United States policy, officials often exaggerated the importance of certain victories, such as
those at various installations on the Laotian-Vietnamese border, or lessened the devastation of
certain failures, especially the successful Viet Minh invasion of Laos. The United States also
5
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avoided the use of its own troops out of legitimate fears of the negative public opinion that
would surely result. From the death of French General de Lattre in January 1952 onward,
however, French-Vietnamese troops did not enjoy the successes they once had under his
leadership. Confined to mainly defensive operations, the chance of a French victory lessened as
time went on. Clearly, United States policymakers did not take their differences with the French
fully into account. While the French wanted to withdraw from the war in Indochina as quickly as
possible, the United States was committed to holding the line against the Communists as long as
they deemed necessary.
The dual goals of holding the line against communism and avoiding direct intervention
ultimately proved impossible to accomplish. Truman, by the end of his last term, and
Eisenhower, his successor, were fully aware that the French wanted to withdraw from the region
as soon as they could, but they both remained committed to avoiding American intervention in
the region. They also sought to keep Indochina within the Free World, knowing that some type
of Free World intervention was necessary to hold the region away from the Communist Bloc,
especially considering Indochina’s proximity to the People’s Republic of China. Conscious of
some type of necessary intervention and attentive to the French desires to pull out, the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations remained committed to avoiding formal American entrance in
the region. Successively through the years of 1952, 1953, and 1954, however, American officials
gradually increased their contributions to the region in the forms of finances, technology,
supplies, and equipment. These gradual increases that ultimately amounted to the United States
fighting the Indochina War with French troops on the ground proved how nonintervention would
not succeed. In order to keep Indochina in the hands of the Free World, the United States would
have to intervene. Clearly, the Indochina War, termed by most as a French defeat, was also a loss
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for American interests. After the defeat, the United States refused to sign the Geneva Accords
and soon succumbed to the intervention they had been leading themselves to for the past several
years.
Clearly, from the American perspective, the containment of communism was essential.
Also essential, however, was nonintervention in the region. Ultimately, during the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations, accomplishing both goals proved impossible. In seeking to prevent
a communist takeover in the region, American officials under the two administrations chose
continually to increase American aid to the French and their allies without going so far as to
make the United States an official belligerent in the conflict. With this nonintervention policy,
however, French troops with ever-decreasing morale were fighting on the ground with American
funds, supplies, and equipment. This soon led to a disastrous defeat, and the peace accords at
Geneva called for eventual, nationwide free elections. These free elections would almost
certainly lead to a victory by Ho Chi Minh, in other words, a victory for the communist forces.
The two chief goals of the United States in Indochina between 1952 and 1954—preventing
communist control of the region while not intervening directly—had clearly failed. This failure
of American policy in Indochina was proven not just at Geneva; it gradually developed
throughout their first years in the region, during the early 1950s.

9

Chapter 1: From Truman to Eisenhower
Even before United States involvement in the French-Indochinese conflict, Indochina
was a region that suffered from almost constant oppression from outsiders. French hegemony in
the area encompassed Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, also known as the Associated States, lasted
almost seventy years, beginning in the 1880s and lasting into the mid-1950s.
In the 1950s, Vietnam was an agricultural nation with few large cities. The great majority
of Vietnamese were Buddhists, while the other ten percent, particularly the Montagnard people
of the highlands, practiced Catholicism. Confucianism was another influence on Vietnamese
culture. Overall, with China directly to its North, Vietnam and Indochina as a whole were
influenced immensely by their Mandarin neighbor. Furthermore, the patriarchal village structure
was the basis of the society. Village councils ran the local affairs, with tradition and custom
reigning supreme.6 Vietnam also had a history of foreign occupations by China, Japan, France,
and eventually America.
In light of the dominion of foreign powers in his country, Ho Chi Minh emerged as the
great symbol of Vietnamese nationalism. Born in 1890, he grew up in the French Indochinese
empire and was a champion of Vietnamese independence from a young age. He began his
secondary school studies in the city of Hue in central Vietnam and also was employed as a
translator for French officials. At the age of seventeen, Ho was caught in a violent peasant
6
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demonstration in the city, causing his expulsion from school and his name to be placed on a
French black list. In response, he soon traveled to Saigon in 1911 and eventually made it all the
way to Paris. Ho still resided in France during the Versailles Peace Conference that ended the
First World War. The first part of the peace accords, concerning the League of Nations,
explained how “The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of
the League.”7 Motivated by this clause and its implications for Vietnamese independence, Ho
wrote to President Woodrow Wilson, listing various French colonial abuses in Vietnam. Ho later
proclaimed, “It was patriotism, not communism, that inspired me.”8 Unfortunately, Wilson
ignored Ho’s letter, as did the other major powers. Then, in Paris, after the rebuff by Wilson, one
can see the first indication of Ho’s communist ties, for in 1920, he joined the communist party.
His ties to the Kremlin were further corroborated by his enrollment in the University of Toilers
in the Soviet Union and his work in China as a Comintern agent. His training and education in
the Sino-Soviet territories undoubtedly led to his founding of the Vietnamese Communist Party
in 1930 in Hong Kong,9 but Ho’s main concern was not an alliance to China and the Soviet
Union; his chief desire was independence for his country, and independence for Ho and other
nationalists meant the absence of all foreign control, capitalist or communist. For example, while
in Hong Kong in 1930, Ho outlined his desires for Vietnamese sovereignty. Among his many
goals was the desire “to make Indochina completely independence,” as well as the ambition, “to
7
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bring back all freedom to the masses.”10 Clearly, though writing to communists, Ho’s main goal
was Vietnamese independence. One must also consider Ho’s background in Chinese culture.
With Vietnam’s position so close to the Chinese border, he spoke both Mandarin and Cantonese.
As another observer emphasized, “Ho was forced into dependence upon Peking and Moscow by
American opposition or indifference.”11 His cultural background was undoubtedly Asian, but he
always tried to balance Vietnam’s ties to the USSR and China.12 Ultimately, the only option he
saw to gain his country’s independence was through the communists.
He continued to work in Moscow in the 1930s, but by the start of World War II, Ho
realized that his nation faced the dominance of yet another foreign power, Japan. With France
controlled by the German-sympathizing Vichy government, Japan essentially had free reign in
the region. In response, Ho returned to Vietnam in 1940, situating himself in the caves of Pac
Bo, in the Cao Bang province, on the Chinese border. There, he began training indigenous
guerrilla fighters, who would eventually become the Viet Minh, the enemy of the French in their
Indochinese war. Viet Minh training was on a reciprocal basis: once they were trained, they
would go into the population and train others, essentially forming an indigenous, nation-wide
militia. Through this fighting force and his ties to China and the Soviet Union, Ho was able to
become the chief spokesman of the Vietnamese people.13 He possessed great eloquence due to

10

Ho Chi Minh, "Program for Communists of Indochina, 1930," Modern History
Sourcebook, Available from http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1930hochiminh.html. Internet;
accessed 14 December 2010.
11

Patti, 392.

12

Jean Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh and His Vietnam (Chicago: Cowles Books, 1972), 120.

13

Morgan, 32-33.

12

his extensive classical educational training, rallying his people to support “the resistance”14
against French control. He also inspired determination and spirit within the people, telling them
“In each of you exists heroism in the bud, you must develop it.”15 Ho’s inspiration contrasted
dramatically with the lack of dynamism present in the South Vietnamese leaders.
The military leader in the North, Vo Nguyen Giap, shared in Ho’s anti-French history.
Giap’s family, comprised of anti-French militants, suffered greatly under colonial rule. Various
members of his family were arrested and sometimes subsequently killed under French
supervision. In 1937, he joined Indochina’s communist party and helped Ho trained Viet Minh
cadres in the 1940s. They not only formed fighting forces but also propaganda teams, first to oust
the Japanese and then to expel the French after their return to power the region in 1945.16
Together, Giap and Ho were the foundation of official Vietnamese leadership in the North but
were also the ostensible leaders throughout the region, Ho symbolically and Giap militarily.
They appealed to the nationalist aspirations of the population and strengthened indigenous
military muscle, giving the Vietnamese hope that their nation could finally be rid of foreign
domination.
The situation in the South was completely different. The vast majority of the population
occupied the nationalist camp, but they were ruled in the South by an elite political structure.17
Emperor Bao Dai, the ruler of South Vietnam, was ultimately the antithesis of Ho Chi Minh.
United States officials frequently cited him as unwilling to put forth the necessary effort to
14
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inspire those under his control to action. As Minister Donald Heath, stationed in Saigon
throughout much of the 1950s, articulated, “It is not likely that he will ever be moved to the real
activity that the situation requires.”18 Often, he was not even in the country but, instead, was
traveling elsewhere, usually in France. He also did not make worthy appointments, placing
individuals in power with similar characteristics to himself, and various political groups were
frequently unrepresented.19 Admittedly, most of the leaders of Vietnam were stationed in posts in
the North, not in posts under French hegemony. Overall, there was a lack of trained officials to
comprise a South Vietnamese government and military. Some even advocated for more French
officials in the government to bolster its decision-making power.20 There was also the problem of
the Vietnamese National Army in the South. Firstly, Bao Dai was unwilling to devote enough
energy to the project, essentially dooming it from the start. Officials seem to attribute this lack of
determination to something intrinsically within Bao Dai’s character. One must consider,
however, the explanation offered by United States Ambassador to Indochina Donald Heath:
In the beginning, the only solution was the Bao Dai solution and that was still
true…The monarchy was the only institution which could hold this deeply
divided country together but monarchial sentiment was diminishing rapidly
because of Bao Dai’s poor performance and example.21

18
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Also, French Union forces were responsible for training the army, not indigenous military
leaders.22 The contrasts between North and South were readily apparent. The North had an
effective indigenous army controlled by indigenous leaders. They also had a governmental
structure supported by the population at large. The South’s army, on the other hand, was led by
French personnel, representing colonialism to the local population, and the weak government,
comprised of ineffective Vietnamese leaders as well as French subjects, some actually from the
colonial period, resulted in almost complete apathy on the part of the Vietnamese population.
Ultimately, the French “offer[ed] a shadow of reform but retain[ed] the substance of French
control.”23
The French, in their war against the nationalists under Ho Chi Minh, sought to preserve
French prestige while simultaneously scaling back their involvement in the conflict on a gradual
basis. Still recovering from World War II, the French financial situation was certainly not ideal,
and the French also had an obligation to contribute funds to the rebuilding and rearmament of
Europe. The French, therefore, needed troops in Europe as well as in Indochina, and placing
them in both areas caused shortages on each front. Essentially, the French could not afford to
contribute to both efforts, so, in turn, both efforts suffered and were significantly delayed.
Additionally, while the North Vietnamese and many in the south sought independence, the
French wanted to preserve the French Union and prevent Indochina from falling under Chinese
control.24 In order to achieve these goals: the preservation of the French Union, victory in
22
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Indochina, and reconstruction in Europe, the French sought help internationally, particularly
from the United Kingdom and the United States. Ultimately, American and French officials alike
believed that “The solution can eventually be sought only on the international plane.”25 French
public opinion did not look as positively on the situation, for morale on the home front seemed to
only get lower as the war endured. They termed the Indochina war as “la guerre occultée,”26
translated as the “obscure” war for their country. Even in early 1952, Minister Heath described
how a “withdrawal psychology [was] apparently gaining ground in Paris.”27 The French were
clearly in precarious circumstances. With a population weary of war and apathetic towards the
Indochina situation, the government faced difficult policy decisions. There also existed elements
in the government, such as those from the communist and socialist factions, who advocated for
withdrawal as soon as possible.28 All these quandaries of French involvement in Indochina
would ultimately come to a head by mid 1954.
The United States, though the main French backer financially, did not possess the same
goals as their allies in the region. In 1952, President Harry S. Truman was in a precarious
situation. With the rise of the Soviet Union in the period immediately after World War II, the
fear of communism grew exponentially throughout the Free World. This especially manifested
itself through Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, prompting the Truman Doctrine. In the
25
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Truman Doctrine, the President dictated the special responsibility of the United States to
preserve freedom and self-determination:
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own
destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly
political processes.29
Approved by Congress, the Truman Doctrine essentially gave the administration significant
funding and personnel to halt a Soviet takeover in Greece or Turkey, setting a precedent for
future United States aid. The speech also laid out the doctrine of containment—fundamental to
Cold War policy; American policymakers wanted to contain the spread of communism into other
areas of the world. Communism was also seen as a monolith; American officials thought all
communist policy emanated from one spot, the Kremlin. Essentially, they viewed all the
communists as speaking with one voice. Unfortunately for Truman, communism’s spread to
China in 1949 could not be prevented despite American support for the nationalists. In response,
many present and future American officials blamed Truman and his administration for the loss of
China to the communists. The defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and the ascension of Mao Tse-tung
thereafter affected the majority of Truman’s foreign policy decisions. The Chinese also
recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the government in the North, as the legitimate
Vietnamese government in 1950, further challenging the relationship between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China.30 Truman did not want to suffer similar blame for the loss of
other countries to the Communists, so his Cold War policy began to follow more of a hard line.
29
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Examples of this hard line include the United States involvement in the Korean conflict in 1950
as well as increased United States aid to the French in Indochina. As Archimedes L.A. Patti
eloquently articulates, United States officials did not attempt to understand the culture of
Southeast Asia; they merely remained committed to preventing communist expansion there:
Our unfortunate stereotype of a monolithic communist expansionary bloc and our
emotional approach to the “loss” of China were paths leading into the quicksands.
Our domino theory pushed us along those paths a little faster. And then our lack
of knowledge in depth of the individuality of the states of Southeast Asia and the
separateness of their societies disguised the dangers along the paths we had
taken.31
In the years that followed, from 1952 to 1954, and certainly beyond, North and South Vietnam,
France, and the United States would all be intimately connected in a conflict with little mutual
understanding.
The death of French General Jean de Lattre marked the first major turning point of 1952
in United States policy toward the French effort in Indochina. Before his withdrawal from
leadership in the region in 1951, French morale and public opinion remained at a stable
midpoint, for the French public did not view the war pessimistically nor advocate for withdrawal.
Despite the absence of a decisive victory, the French had the upper hand militarily, and de Lattre
provided effective leadership of the forces in Indochina. With his departure in 1951 and
imminent death on 11 January 1952, however, a withdrawal psychology began to seriously
develop within the French mindset. At this point, they certainly did not want to abandon the
struggle all together, for this was most clearly indicated by the passage of the military budget for
Indochina in the National Assembly by votes of 510:109. As United States Ambassador to
France David Bruce reported to the State Department on 3 January, however, France “looks
toward an increased Anglo-American sharing of the burden in Indo-China in connection with
31
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tripartite cooperation in Southeast Asia.”32 Though tripartite involvement was emphasized, the
French expected the main player to be the United States. With United States aid, they hoped to
reach a successful conclusion of the conflict resulting in the preservation of the French Union.33
The United States, on the other hand, was reluctant to become involved in another war in
Asia, for it already had its troops on the ground in Korea. They also had different goals in the
region than the French. The main reason the United States promoted French interests in
Indochina was for the purpose of halting communism’s spread. Most recognized that if the
French withdrew, a communist victory would follow within a short time. The region offered,
among a Free World enclave, other advantages to the United States:
The fall of Indo-China would be a psychological victory of the first magnitude for
the Communist Bloc, would undermine the determination of the governments and
people of Burma and Thailand to resist communist aggression, would hinder the
“encirclement” of Communist China by noncommunist states, would providence
the Communist Bloc with control of additional sources of food and strategic
materials, and would deny to the West the strategic position and resources of
Indochina.34
Clearly, one could see in the region two sets of advantages, one ideological and one logistical.
Ideologically, the United States wanted to stop the spread of communism out of a fear of
communist domination of the entire region. This fear was articulated in the domino theory, most
commonly associated with Eisenhower but actually begun under the Truman administration. A
later State Department paper described the likelihood of “bandwagon jumping” by the

32

“The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State,” January 3, 1952,
Paris, FRUS, Vol XIII, Part I, 7.
33

“The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State,” January 3, 1952,
Paris, FRUS, Vol XIII, Part I, 4-8.
34

“National Intelligence Estimate,” March 3, 1952, Washington, FRUS, Vol. XIII, Part I,

58.

19

neighboring territories should there be a communist victory in Vietnam.35 Outside of intervening
with ground troops, the United States was willing to take all necessary measures to aid the
French. Furthermore, they wanted to ensure that this aid would be based on cooperation from
other nations, agreeing to “carry out…minimum courses of military action under the auspices of
the UN or in conjunction with France and the UK and other friendly governments.”36 To
American officials, the war’s ideological basis was also immensely important, as Congressman
Mike Mansfield, a Democrat from Montana, articulated in 1952:
The Indo-China danger was two fold: 1. If the Communists should win, he said,
all of Southeast Asia would be open to them. That would be an extremely critical
loss for us because Europe needs those resources. 2. The campaign itself, he
declared, represents an increasingly heavy drain on French resources and military
manpower, which affects the European build-up.37
As the paraphrasing of Congressman Mansfield indicates, Europe also needed the resources of
Southeast Asia.
At the same time, the war was draining the French of their resources in the rebuilding of
Europe. Practically, the region offered various resources, especially rice, rubber, and oil. The
United States was particularly worried about the availability of these resources for the newly
democratic Japanese government. Surrounded by China and the Soviet Union, the United States
wanted to ensure that Japan would remain a part of the Free World. Without the resources of
Southeast Asia, Japan might be forced to turn itself over to the communists:
Communist conquest or acquisition of Southeast Asia would spread doubt and
fear among other threatened noncommunist countries and create the feeling that
communism was the “wave of the future” and that the United States and the Free
35
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World were unable to halt its advance. Countries…would be encouraged to adopt
policies of accommodation to communist pressures and objectives.38
The region’s resources also benefited the United States, France, and other European nations. The
resources in Vietnam and the neighboring areas included rice, rubber, tin, tungsten, and oil, all
immensely important, especially in wartime. The French had another goal in the region not
shared by the United States; they wanted to preserve French prestige through the continuation of
the French Union. The United States, on the other hand, feared that this French goal would
present Indochina as a “conspicuous remnant of Western colonialism in the Far East.”39 They
instead favored a policy of independence in the region as soon as possible, as long as the
resulting nation would be in the Free World camp. Despite this goal, the United States was
unwilling to intervene directly in the region.
From the outset of 1952, the United States’ goals in the region were bound for failure. In
terms of ground forces, they sought to “supplement rather than supplant French efforts in
Indochina.” These supplements included financial and mechanical aid to France and the
Associated States, the nations of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. They also wanted to ensure the
French would stay in Indochina while at the same time commit to their burdens in Europe. While
ensuring French involvement, the United States wanted independence for the Associated States,
seeking to improve their armies, their economies, and their governments. Finally, the United
States desired the assurance that mainland China would not become directly involved in the
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Indochinese War.40 Ultimately, the supplements would never be sufficient. Firstly, low French
morale prevented much of their military strategy from being implemented and thus delayed any
type of decisive French victory in the region. Also, the French and the South Vietnamese
government were often unwilling to train indigenous military and political personnel. This meant
the entire government was virtually controlled by Bao Dai’s appointments and the entire national
army controlled by French Union officers. Chinese intervention was essentially ensured
throughout 1952, although Chinese intervention would only follow from United States
intervention. China would not step foot in the door unless provoked by United States entrance.
Clearly, the United States could not halt communism’s spread without becoming directly
involved in the region, and even that was questionable in terms of its success, for the Vietnamese
as a national entity saw nationalist and communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader. In general, they
looked to the French and the West with apathy. Even in early 1952, the United States knew these
facts. The State Department considered the use of American forces as an eventual course of
action. They also understood the necessity of ensuring independence to the Vietnamese while at
the same time presenting communism as the enemy of true independence.41 As the conflict in the
region continued, there would be slight upturns amongst many disastrous downturns. The United
States, however, remained committed through the next several years to the dual policy of
stemming the spread of communism while not implementing ground forces, a policy that would
eventually result in disaster.
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Different schools of thought emerged within the Truman administration regarding the
implementation of US policy in Indochina, including groups led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the State Department. Omar Bradley led the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Dean
Acheson led the State department. Surprisingly, Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett was also
usually allied with the State Department on the Indochina issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored
the implementation of either a direct warning to Communist China or even direct intervention in
the region. They believed the United States should take a risk with regard to China, even though
they admitted that United States intervention could possibly result in subsequent Chinese
intervention. They also advocated for United States primacy in the region, articulating that “our
allies, notably Britain and France, were expected to support us if we became engaged in a war
against Communist China, but that we alone should undertake to run the show.”42 The State
Department, on the other hand, favored a more indirect policy, believing that “United States
objectives in Indo-China can be achieved only through the French.”43 Clearly, there was a
difference of opinion in the Truman Administration.44 One must consider, however, that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, led by the leaders of the armed forces, generally take a hard-line towards United
States involvement in world conflicts. The same was the case in Indo-China. The State
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Department and Defense Secretary, on the other hand, did not support intervention because they
feared all-out war with China. As Lovett said at the National Security Council meeting, “it would
presumably be very sensible to spend more money…in support of resistance there. In any case,
this would be very much cheaper than an all-out war against Communist China.”45 The dilemma
here became quite clear: direct intervention would cause Chinese aggression, while no official
intervention would lead to eventual French defeat, allied withdrawal, and a communist victory.
Meanwhile, in Metropolitan France, public and governmental opinion was declining
rapidly. Leading French officials Jean Monnet and Pierre Uri, for example, described the
detrimental effects of the Indo-China War on both the French economy and the position of
France on the European continent. Monnet even suggested that the only option for the French
was withdrawal from the region. They also stressed how taxes on the French people could not be
increased due to low morale. Ultimately, they believed that the mutual goal of halting
communism’s spread was a goal “of common interest to all the Western powers and that the
burden accordingly must be more equitably distributed.”46 The stress here was upon the United
States and Great Britain contributing more to the conflict and eventually replacing French forces.
Other French leaders were much more optimistic, most of the time overly optimistic. Jean
Letourneau was the most apparent optimist, proclaiming, “There is no question of choice
between the problem of Indo-China and that of Europe.”47 He stressed the importance of French
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involvement in both areas on the condition that the United States would contribute more funding,
which would, in turn, help to bolster the power of the Vietnamese national army and eventually
make them self-sufficient in the fight against the Viet Minh. Clearly, the differences here rested
on tensions between the first option of withdrawal and the other option of staying the course with
increased aid. The school of thought represented here by Monnet and Uri was willing to
negotiate should conditions prove favorable. Supporters of Letourneau’s view, however, did not
believe it was likely that the North would want to negotiate presently.48 Clearly, in both the
United States and France, there were competing policy decisions at work that would directly
affect the actions of both nations in Southeast Asia.
Another important development of 1952 was the Mutual Security Program, enacted in
March. Under the program, the United States proclaimed its goals for collective security as well
as self-determination, as long as it was in the national interests of the United States. The program
also called for assistance to allied nations to bolster Free World defenses.49 The program clearly
aligned with processes of increased aid to the French in Indochina as well as anticommunist
policy, and gave “Broad discretion…to the President in use of these funds.”50 The funding
required for the program amounted to almost eight billion dollars, some of which would go to
French-Vietnamese forces in Indochina. In his message to the American people, President
Truman proclaimed the necessity of the program in light of the world situation:
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History has thrust a fearful responsibility upon the United States. Today, the
survival of freedom and civilization on this earth may depend on the initiative and
decisions taken in our own nation’s capital. The free peoples look to us for
leadership. Leadership implies more than a recognition of the problem.51
This theme of the United States’ special responsibility to the Free World would appear again and
again throughout the 1950s. This responsibility would eventually plunge the United States closer
and closer into taking the full responsibility for the fight against the communists in Vietnam as
French efforts faltered throughout 1952 and after.
The developments occurring during the first half of 1952 in Vietnam obviously affected
French and United States interests alike. From 1952 to 1954, Donald Heath, the Foreign Minister
at Saigon, presented an increasingly overly optimistic opinion of the situation in Southeast Asia
and thus managed to slightly skew United States policy in the region. In January of 1952, for
instance, he admitted the threat posed by the increases in Viet Minh force concentrations in the
Tonkin Delta and on the Black River, saying that “Viet Minh regular forces have not declined in
strength or spirit and that they can infiltrate the Delta while conducting massive frontal
attacks.”52 He also described the ineffective nature of the Vietnamese national army, especially
as opposed to the Viet Minh’s current strength. Finally, Heath asserted his doubts on a French
offensive in the future, when he stated how “20 fighters and as many bombers used
systematically by Viet Minh or Chi could jeopardize even holding operation.”53 Despite these
underlying disadvantages, he advised increases in United States aid, emphasizing that
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“Internatlizing[sic] probably boils down to stipulating use [of] US force if burden becomes too
great for France or if Chi[sic] invades.”54 Despite his pushes for increased American
involvement, he remained a constant critic of Bao Dai, frequently painting him as an
overconfident leader with little concern outside his own personal interests. Secretary of State
Dean Acheson expressed similar views negative on Bao Dai, expressing that “Until he has
demonstrated [the] will [to] buckle down to [the] job and [to] put existing auth[sic] to good use
in dealing with immed[sic] and pressing problems, it is premature [to] encourage [the]
enlargement of his role.”55 Both individuals agreed with Letourneau, emphasizing increased
American monetary support while the French shouldered the burden of the actual fight. 56
Militarily, the withdrawal of French forces from Hoa Binh, located in Northwestern
Vietnam, had major repercussions for France and the United States. On 25 January 1952,
General Salan, the three star general who replaced General de Lattre, expressed confidence in
French-Vietnamese ability to hold the post.57 Heath also expressed how “Salan said he entirely
confident that Fr Union would throw back Viet Minh.”58 Strategically, Hoa Binh was the only
route connecting Viet Minh forces in the north with those south of the Tonkin Delta. Due to Viet
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Minh pressure, the French had to withdraw on 22 February, losing almost 1,600 men, who were
wounded, captured, or killed in action. Though Viet Minh casualties were upwards of 20,000,
French withdrawal remained significant, especially in terms of the public’s view. Withdrawal
was truly the only option because “The Viet Minh had succeeded in developing a parallel route
bypassing Hoa Binh…and the number of forces pinned down at Hoa Binh jeopardized loyalist
control of other more important parts of the Red River Delta into which the Viet Minh had
already begun to infiltrate.”59 The North Vietnamese also successfully used propaganda
techniques to present the withdrawal as a Viet Minh victory and a French defeat despite the
casualty figures. For example, the Viet Minh lost 22,000 (killed, wounded, or captured), while
the French only lost 1588 in comparison. The implications in France were similar, as certain
newspapers sympathizing with the withdrawal school of though published negative articles on
the operation.60 The military implications of the withdrawal were not nearly as disastrous as the
press presented them. The defensive perimeter was reduced, but the French-Vietnamese
combined forces were actually now in a better offensive position according to American officials
both inside the region, like Heath, and outside the region, like Acheson.61 Additionally, Edmund
Gullion, the Chargé d’Affaires, believed that the withdrawal “placed [French] forces in a
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position to strike within the delta or meet an attack against the perimeter elsewhere.”62 The
withdrawal of Hoa Binh, though not amounting to a decisive loss, reinforced the view that the
war in Indochina remained a stalemate, particularly because of “French-Vietnamese
insufficiency of power to move permanently outside the Tongking delta and clean up the main
bases of Vietminh strength.”63 Both United States and French officials knew that the Hoa Binh
withdrawal was not as disastrous as the press published, but they were essentially powerless to
alter well-established public opinion.
Further escalations in financial aid to Indochina marked American policy in the second
half of 1952. In order to keep the French and South Vietnamese in the battle, a view particularly
supported by Secretary of State Acheson, the United States had to increase its monetary aid to
the region and even to Metropolitan France.64 As the Pentagon Papers reveal, “We will
recommend to the Congress appropriate military, economic and financial aid to France and the
Associated States.”65 In June, representatives from the United States and France met in
Washington, D.C., to discuss their general policies toward Indochina. The French believed it
would be impossible to negotiate with the Viet Minh because the Viet Minh would probably
bring in the Chinese, especially considering Ho Chi Minh’s connections to the communists. They
also emphasized their inability to maintain their efforts in both Indochina and Europe without
sacrificing in one area. United States aid could help immensely in the maintenance of their
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efforts in both regions. American officials spoke next, mostly avoiding the topics of aid while
proclaiming that the French must accelerate the process of independence to the Associated
States, emphasizing how “we were determined to bring forward the three states to the position
where they could stand alone.”66 While stressing that the United States, France, and Britain were
united against communism in all their efforts, they simultaneously differentiated between zones
of interest; the United States was in Korea, the British were in Malaya, and the French were in
Indochina. Each had its own region of influence in the common fight against communism.67
United States officials knew, however, that the French could not maintain their fight without
outside assistance, for it was accepted that. “The French have continued to make the great
sacrifices in men and treasure which they have made only because they were given assurances of
American support—political, economic, and military.”68
Throughout the summer of 1952, both sides of the fight regrouped in preparation for the
end of the rainy season. By October, the belligerents resumed the battle, and the French effort
crumbled more and more. Viet Minh offensives against the Franco-Vietnamese forces were
abundant, particularly at Nghia Lo and Lai Chau as well as throughout the Thai country. Though
the French had more troops in total than the Viet Minh, they were organized less efficiently and
were thus easily overwhelmed by Viet Minh forces. By the end of October, the Viet Minh had
gained control throughout Tonkin with the exception of the Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter, which
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was still in French control.69 Viet Minh victories continued throughout the year, with frequent
French withdrawals. By the end of the year, many predicted that the Viet Minh were planning a
large-scale offensive in Laos and in the Thai country in the near future.70 These French setbacks
created greater urgency for United States aid. Requests for both more monetary funds and
mechanical aid, such as United States Air Force mechanics, were abundant.71
Overall, the Truman administration continually escalated their aid to the French
throughout 1952 in the promotion of containment policy. To contain communism from reaching
Southeast Asia, both schools of thought, one under the Joint Chiefs, the other under the State
Department, believed that the United States had to aid the French in their Indochina war. If not,
the French would certainly be defeated, withdrawing from the region and leaving it open to
Chinese intervention. Though the schools of thought differed in their views on the approaches
and methods this aid should take, continued aid was never questioned. It was deemed a necessity
for the perpetuation of Free World interests in general and American interests in particular.
Despite recurrent French setbacks, Truman and his advisors granted constant aid in evenincreasing numbers. The swelling aid numbers were bringing the United States closer and closer
to the fight.
This is the situation incumbent Dwight Eisenhower faced when he was elected on
November 2, 1952. He did not enter office until January of the next year, but the importance of
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Vietnam would only grow. The courses of action set in place by the Truman administration
would only be increased under Eisenhower, for “Eisenhower’s administration felt it had little
choice left except to follow the course laid down by Truman.”72 As United States involvement in
Korea scaled down throughout his first term in office, United States involvement in Indochina
would increase and essentially become the more important foreign policy issue of the 1950s. As
one American observer proclaimed, “If they pull out, the question is put to us,”73 meaning that
French defeat in the region would leave the problem of retaining Southeast Asia to the United
States.
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Chapter 2: 1953, A Monumental Year
With the ascension of Dwight Eisenhower to the presidency, a coalition of
cooperationists and hard-line cold warriors joined the ranks of Eisenhower’s advisors. The fear
of communist domination of the world still remained a problem, but unlike the witch-hunting
schemes of Senator Joseph McCarthy during Truman’s administration, Eisenhower emphasized
that, “The primary responsibility for keeping out the disloyal and the dangerous rests squarely on
the executive branch.”74 Eisenhower and his advisors did not want to suffer the same fate as the
Truman administration with China’s entrance into the Communist bloc.
Policy nominally shifted toward a “New Look”, but the policy in Indochina remained
quite the same, following the trend of increasing aid to the French. Eisenhower was elected on
several premises, promising this “New Look” for American policy, as well as “More Bang for
the Buck.” The New Look rested on three principles articulated by Eisenhower in a campaign
speech:
First, America must be militarily and productively strong… Second, we must
build greater cooperative unity with every nation in the Free World that is
prepared to stand with us, work with us, build with us for the security of all of
us… Third, our Government, once and for all, with cold finality, must tell the
Kremlin that we shall never recognize the slightest permanence in Russia’s
position in Eastern Europe and Asia.75
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Implicit in this New Look policy was “More Bang for the Buck.” In making America militarily
strong, military spending would be reduced in an effort to get more productivity for a lower
price, replacing conventional forces with nuclear capabilities. Further, Eisenhower and his
advisors, most notably Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, sought to expand NATO alliances
with new nations throughout the world to bolster the strength of the Free World against the SinoSoviet sphere. Finally, the Eisenhower administration did not want to suffer the same fate as the
Truman Administration, ever-blamed for the loss of China to the communists. Like his
predecessor, he emphasized self-determination throughout the world, proclaiming, “we shall
never use our strength to try to impress upon another people our own cherished political and
economic institutions.”76 In reality, the United States supported any regime that was not
communist in nature. Indochina clearly took a prominent place in this discussion. With China
neighboring directly to the North, communist infiltration was quite plausible. Indochina thus
became the major foreign policy issue of Eisenhower’s administration.
On 18 November 1952, President-elect Eisenhower met with Truman and his cabinet
members to discuss the issues Eisenhower would face once inaugurated in January. Secretary of
State Dean Acheson conveyed the various implications the Indochina conflict had on United
States policy:
We are helping France to the extent of carrying between one-third and one-half of
the financial burden of the Indochinese War. We have had military discussions
between the five powers…which have not been effective in devising agreed
military solutions against the contingency of overt Chinese intervention in
Indochina.77
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This clearly implied the stalemate, both militarily and diplomatically. Militarily, the French
suffered repeated attacks by the Viet Minh and were unable to hold their defensive positions.
Diplomatically, neither side could agree to a solution; the United States was also assuming the
main burden of financing the war. As Donald Heath said at the start of the New Year, “Thanks to
United States arms aid, the Franco-Vietnamese forces now have an edge over the Viet-Minh.”78
One can see here once again Heath’s undue optimism. Though the French had agreed to increase
the Vietnamese National Army by about 40,000 men by October, the Viet Minh retained the
edge militarily. For instance, the Thai Country offensive of the previous year had forced the
Franco-Vietnamese into defensive positions. The Viet Minh retained the psychological
advantage, as well, giving the population something to fight for and using effective propaganda,
while Bao Dai remained completely ineffective in the South. The French were also weak in their
devotion to the war. Though individuals such as Letourneau did not favor negotiation, others,
such as Pierre Mendes-France, wanted to get out of the war as soon as possible. 79 For example,
Mendes-France, a member of both the French National Assembly and the left-wing, “look to
negotiations with Ho Chi Minh as means permitting French withdrawal.”80 Eisenhower faced
quite the quandary.
The French Union forces had to confront the growing strength of the Viet Minh forces.
The Viet Minh had 400,000 men, while the French-Vietnamese possessed 460,000 men. While
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the Viet Minh were a largely homogeneous entity of Vietnamese and possibly some Chinese, the
French Union forces contained members of the Associated States, Metropolitan France, and
various other regions of the French Union. These other individuals included Senegalese, North
Africans, and French Legionnaires, among others. Essentially a conglomerate of different
individuals with no common goal, the French-Vietnamese force was no match for the Viet Minh.
Territorially, the Franco-Vietnamese controlled Hanoi, Saigon, and a few other small areas.
Throughout Tonkin, Central Annam, and certain parts of Cochin Chinese, they had nominal
control but suffered Viet Minh guerrilla operations very often. The Viet Minh, on the other hand,
gained territory in the last several years of the war and were in positions to win further
victories.81 In light of these military deficiencies, the French pushed for more United States aid
to continue the fight in Indochina.
Two schools of thought developed within the Eisenhower administration on Indochina.
One believed there would be no development in the region until they achieved a military victory
against the communists. The spokesmen for this approach were the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
other school of thought believed it was effectively impossible to accomplish a military victory
until the governments in the area were improved and granted more autonomy. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles and other officials of the State Department supported this approach.82 Neither
school of thought denied the necessity of more United States aid nor wanted United States
ground troops involved in the conflict. The Eisenhower administration furthered the development
of a policy that assumed American aid would cover France’s Indochina War. There was also
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little Congressional opposition to this trend For example, Representative Mansfield conveyed
early in Eisenhower’s first term the necessity of Free World control of Indochina:
Indochina is at this time the most important area on the Continent of Asia. Its loss
would start a chain-reaction extending to the Persian Gulf and would give to the
Soviets and their satellites the rubber, the tin and the oil which are in such short
supply within the Soviet Union and which mean so much in the conduct of war.83
Under the Truman administration, increasing aid was more questioned by Congress and other
government officials. Now, the trend toward increasing American involvement was much more
accepted. Both administrations up to this point, though, agreed that United States ground troop
involvement was still not a possibility for victory in Indochina.
The Viet Minh invasion of Laos in April 1953 affected both the French effort in
Indochina as well as United States policy in the region. Militarily, the French responded by
requesting loans of United States aircraft to transport ammunition, supplies, and equipment, all
of which would aid them in the upcoming rainy season. At the 141st Meeting of the National
Security Council, all who were present questioned the true effectiveness this aid would actually
provide. They wanted to pressure the French “that unless they formed larger units of native
forces and took the offensive against the enemy, further U.S. aid would not be forthcoming.”84
They also advocated for a new French general to help turn the tides in the war. Surprisingly, the
aid request was eventually granted despite these misgivings. Diplomatically, the United States
wanted the French to approach the United Nations for a resolution condemning the Viet Minh
aggression. The resolution, if vetoed by the Soviet Union or if the Soviet Union chose to abstain,
would amount to some conflict within the communist camp. A veto would cause the invasion
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itself to rest on Russia, while an abstention would cause China to question the Soviet Union’s
commitment to victory in Southeast Asia. The French, however, as Dulles said at another
Presidential meeting the day before, “indicated a reluctance to take this step, a reluctance born
out of fear that this might precipitate a colonial debate.”85 Despite American pressures, the
French never went before the United Nations. They instead remained on the defensive in Laos,
still underestimating the power of the Viet Minh. The French did agree, however, to appoint a
new commander.86
General Henri Navarre replaced General Salan in May 1953 as the French commander in
Indochina. The rainy season from May to October in Vietnam halted all military actions on both
sides. The interim was the time for planning. Navarre had developed an extensive plan for an
offensive operation against the Viet Minh, something that had been pushed by United States
officials for several years. He would start with local offensives in the summer. Beginning in
September, the offensive would expand to the North to prevent or at least delay an enemy attack.
The bulk of the offensive would be fought during the winter of 1953 to 1954 against the flanks
and rears of enemy forces. Battalions would be grouped into regiments and regiments into
divisions, producing larger units. Cooperation with the navy and air force would be essential in
the operation. The Vietnamese Army and the armies of Laos and Cambodia would also play a
more prominent role in the operation. To conduct the operation, Navarre needed two more
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divisions from the French.87 This Navarre Plan would influence both French and American
policy well into 1954.
While the Navarre Plan was in its first stages of development, American officials
discussed the dire situation in Vietnam. Through mid-1954, a National Intelligence Estimate
predicted an increase in Viet Minh power and a subsequent decrease in French hegemony in the
area: “The lack of French Union military successes, continuing Indochinese distrust of ultimate
French political intentions, and popular apathy will probably continue to prevent significant
increase in Indochinese will and ability to resist the Viet Minh.”88 The Viet Minh would increase
their military strength by continuing attacks in the Tonkin delta as well as areas outside the delta.
French domestic pressures were probably another influence on the decline of French power.
They could reduce the military commitment the French were willing to undertake in the region.
Additionally, the approaching armistice in Korea, though often compared to Indochina by French
officials, would not affect the communist goal of complete control in Indochina and the rest of
Southeast Asia. It was admitted, however, that “The Chinese communists will not invade
Indochina during this period.”89 Despite these predictions, the United States was still willing to
contribute $385 million for Indochina alone.90 They also contributed funds to Metropolitan
France to help in their European initiatives. In light of French public opinion and even some
political opinion in favor of withdrawal from Indochina, the United States should have assumed
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American involvement would eventually have to increase in the form of ground forces. The
military and political situation in favor of the Viet Minh should also have influenced their views,
for the estimate proclaimed how “the overall French Union position in Indochina therefore will
probably deteriorate during the period of this estimate.”91 They remained, however, committed to
keeping the French in the war as long as they could, and in turn, contributing as much United
States aid as possible to accomplish this.
American officials had developed a thorough involvement plan for Indochina by July of
1953. Whether this program could be implemented would only be determined by the future
course of events. State Department officials and French diplomats first considered the French
position on the conflict. Overall, the French wanted to reduce the scale of their involvement in
the region. Different factions on both sides disagreed over the speed of the reduction, but all
were in agreement that eventual reduction was necessary for France to retain her rebuilding
capacities in Europe. To accomplish this reduction, as one could guess by now, they expected
more United States aid. Furthermore, public opinion in France often compared the Korean
armistice talks to the possibility of a similar solution in the near future for Indochina. French
official and former Prime Minister Georges Bidault explained that “The French government is
confronted with the war weariness resulting from seven years of efforts and sacrifices.”92 Bidault
also articulated how “Peace, too, is contagious.”93As the United States ended their Korean
conflict, the French wanted to end their Indochina War. United States government officials,
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however, were confident that negotiations in Indochina would cause a quick communist
takeover. They knew that Ho Chi Minh, the nationalist symbol for the majority of Vietnamese,
“would dominate elections or any coalition government.”94 They also recognized many
differences between Korea and Indochina. Firstly, the populations of North and South Vietnam
were about equal, around eleven million. The populations of North and South Korea were not
nearly as proportional, for there were only six million individuals in the North while twentythree million inhabited the South. Militarily, there was a continuous front in Korea, something
virtually nonexistent in Indochina, where guerrilla operations became the norm.95 Even
Eisenhower, though, could not ignore the fact “that there could be no real peace in Korea that
ignores the broader problems in Asia.”96 By opting for negotiations in Indochina, however, the
French were essentially challenging the goal of the United States to halt the spread of
communism. This difference in policy objectives would plague the eventual negotiations at
Geneva in 1954. Withdrawal occupied the number one spot in the French mindset, so a positive
result in the region was unlikely.
Opinion in France and the United States continued to differ, especially later into 1953.
The differences at this point were clearly articulated by Harold S. Callender, a writer for the New
York Times:
The interest of Washington officials is to save Southeastern Asia from
Communist domination and to this end to get a military plan that promises to
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defeat the Communist-led reels in Indo-China. Such a plan would entail additional
United States aid… The predominant French aim, however, is to get rid of the
responsibility and the human and financial cost of the war in Indo-china, to “bring
the boys home.”97
Clearly, the differences here are obvious. The French wanted to end the war quickly on the most
favorable terms they could. The United States, on the hand, wanted to stay the course and keep
aiding French-Vietnamese forces to ensure Free World control of the region.
Despite the unlikelihood of victory, State Department officials had several
recommendations. The American government pushed the French to enhance the national armies
programs in the Associated States to bolster the military situation. To motivate the population to
fight valiantly, they also pressured the French to give Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam dominion
status, increasing their autonomy. They further recommended that French troop strength should
be increased temporarily in order to take the initiative offensively. To help the French
accomplish these suggestions, the United States would continue to increase their aid proportional
to Chinese aid to the Viet Minh. The Korean armistice would also help the French because it
would release valuable material that could soon be put to French usage. Finally, the United
States was prepared to help train the native armies.98 This marked a major shift in United States
policy in the region. Though informal suggestions had been made frequently on the possibility of
Americans training the armies of the Associated States, this was the first time the suggestions
were made official. Rather than just financial and technical aid, a role for American training
forces was proposed. Ground troops still remained out of the question, but American officials
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had pushed their definition of aid very far. Ultimately, the United States offered anything outside
of ground troops to stunt the communist threat.
The French requested an extra $400 million in United States aid for Indochina. Believing
that Free World ideology in Indochina was essential to containment, the United States agreed to
send an additional $385 million to the French. This sum was in addition to $460 million in aid
promised in April of 1953 and $85 million approved by Congress for arms to the French NATO
forces in Europe. Other types of aid were tacked on as well, such as end-item aid, economic aid,
and basic development assistance. The total aid for Fiscal Year 1953/1954 was $1.07 billion.99
They believed this aid necessary “in support of the additional military effort, with a view to
helping to bring the hostilities in Indochina to a satisfactory conclusion within the foreseeable
future.”100 In the public eye, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the main supporter of this
aid. In a speech to the American Legion in September 1953 on the newly increased independence
program for the Associated States, he highlighted the importance of the region for United States
interests:
The outcome [in Indochina] affects our own vital interests in the western Pacific,
and we are already contributing largely in material and money to the continued
efforts of the French and of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia… This independence
program is along lines which the United States has encouraged and justifies
increased United States aid, provided that will assure an effort there that is
vigorous and decisive.101
Dulles here used the new independence program as a way to rationalize increased United States
involvement in the region. In reality, Bao Dai remained South Vietnam’s leader, an individual
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often associated with sympathizing with the French. He also remained ineffective in inspiring the
population to action.
The lack of improvements in the region and the ongoing rainy season encouraged
American officials to formulate several courses of action to respond to different “what if”
scenarios. The two scenarios considered the reactions and consequences of 1) The defeat of the
French Union and Viet Minh control of the entire region, or 2) The intervention of United States
forces (ground, naval, and air) before such a victory could occur. If the Viet Minh forced France
to withdraw, the risk of communism spreading to all of Southeast Asia would be extremely
perilous for Free World interests. A Viet Minh victory would be “a defeat for the west and a
major blow to U.S. power and prestige in Asia.”102 On the other hand, if American forces
intervened, the noncommunist Indochinese would support them if “they believed that such U.S.
action would soon bring the Indochina war to a close and would ensure the Independence of the
Associated States.”103 United States action, however, would have to be allied action; America
could not militarily act alone in the region.104 Another escalation was clearly visible here. Not
only had training teams been offered, but also now, the United States was beginning to consider
replacing French troops with American troops under united action. Though this was considered,
remaining French involvement was still the main goal. The United States did not seek an
individual war with the Viet Minh. Instead, if necessary, they now were willing to become
involved in a collective conflict that pitted communism against capitalism, the Free World
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against the Communist Bloc. They unfortunately had not yet considered the practical
implications their allies would take into account.
The Dien Bien Phu operation also began in November. Dien Bien Phu was the offensive
Navarre was looking for in the region, or so he thought. A basin surrounded by mountains, Dien
Bien Phu was not geographically ideal, but it was certainly a strategic region in Vietnam. It
would become a decisive battle in the war, actually ending the conflict and prompting the
Geneva Conference, an utter failure in United States foreign policy.
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Chapter 3: Dien Bien Phu and the Tragedy at Geneva
On 20 November 1953, three French battalions parachuted into Dien Bien Phu, only to be
followed by more throughout the remainder of the month. There, they rebuilt the air facilities,
particularly the all-important air strip, so as to make it usable to French Union and indigenous
Vietnamese forces. The purpose of the operation at Dien Bien Phu was the establishment of a
French-Vietnamese base in the Thai Country. The base would help in the defense of Laos and
would also aid the local guerrilla forces against the Viet Minh. Additionally, the base could send
out mobile attack parties in all directions. Franco-Vietnamese forces from other surrounding
areas also descended on Dien Bien Phu to add to its strength. Since mountains and hills
surrounded Dien Bien Phu, all the men and supplies had to be brought in using air power,
rendering control of the skies essential to the operation. This need prompted a further request for
United States supplies, particularly planes and the mechanics that helped them run efficiently.105
Both the United States and France hoped the eventual offensive at Dien Bien Phu would turn the
tides in the war toward a French military victory.
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Despite the moderate successes at transferring Franco-Vietnamese forces into Dien Bien
Phu, the French had to confront yet another Viet Minh invasion of Laos, which, unlike the
previous invasion, targeted central Laos. By the end of December, the Viet Minh had cut
communication and travel lines between Northern and Southern Laos.106 The invasion caused the
evacuation of French Union forces in the area and also bred fears “that the developing mil[itary]
sit[uation] may be so played up in France as to strengthen hand of those political elements
receptive to Ho’s proposal to negotiate settlement between France and Viet Minh.”107 While
Dien Bien Phu currently seemed rather stable, Laos was floundering.
On 8 January 1954, the National Security Council had its 179th Meeting and discussed
Indochina. Vice President Nixon stressed the differences between the French and native
Vietnamese goals. The French fought there to keep Indo-China in the French Union and thus
preserve French prestige, while the Vietnamese fought for independence from the French Union.
President Eisenhower emerged as the individual weariest of introducing United States ground
troops into the region, asking, “When we start putting our men into Indo-China, how long will it
be before we get into the war? And can we afford to get into such a war.”108 Admiral Radford
said that the United States was already in the war now and would be only escalating its
involvement with future aid packages and personnel. By the end of the meeting, they had agreed
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to put more United States planes in Indochina with the insignia painted over. American
personnel would also enter the region, but not personnel directly from the Air Force. Only
General Cutler, special assistant to the President, played the devil’s advocate, emphasizing that
despite Eisenhower’s fears and Radford’s hopes, the United States currently had no authorization
for sending combat forces to the region, asking “Wasn’t the real question before the Council
whether we propose to give in if the French turn to us and request the participation of U.S. forces
in the war in Indochina?”109 He was the only individual at the meeting who stressed government
liability. The other individuals confirmed the very issue at the heart of United States foreign
policy: keeping the French in the war on the ground, while using American supplies, equipment,
and money.110 They would soon learn that this would not be enough to save the French effort in
Indochina.
Meanwhile, Europe, France, the United States, and Great Britain confronted the Soviet
proposal for a Five Power Conference to deal with the problems in Asia. The French, represented
by Bidault, would only support the conference if it were specifically meant to deal with the
problem in Indochina. Dulles countered by saying that a conference on Indochina would not be a
Five Power Conference because the Associated States would obviously want to participate. This
would imply Viet Minh participation. If the participation of the Associated States were
prohibited, however, the major powers would be denying them their freedom and independence.
Eventually, Dulles was able to work out separate conferences for Korea and Indochina rather
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than one large Five Power Conference concerning both foreign policy issues.

111

They would

both be held at Geneva, beginning with the Korean Conference on 26 April. Representatives
from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, China, North Korea, and South
Korea would be present. The conference on Indochina would follow, with representatives of the
Five Powers participating.112
The military situation for the French deteriorated day by day. The Viet Minh were
gaining positions throughout Tonkin, Laos, and around Dien Bien Phu. Most significantly, at
Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh had the high ground while the French occupied the main basin in
the middle. This made the position reliant on air support all the way from Hanoi, two hundred
miles from Dien Bien Phu. The National Security Council met again, at its 183rd meeting, to
discuss these developments as well as the implications for the Vietnamese people. The ability of
the Viet Minh to capture forty French outposts in ten days clearly indicated the indigenous
Vietnamese support they possessed in contrast to the French Union. While French military
leaders remained committed to fighting, public opinion was turning against continued
involvement by France and the United States as military developments further devolved.113 The
eventual failure of the French became quite clear, but American officials were still unwilling to
involve their troops in the field or to accept a communist victory. As Eisenhower said in a news
conference in February, “I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy for America than to get heavily
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involved now in an all-out war in any of those regions, particularly with large units.”114
Unfortunately, Eisenhower’s fears came true; his administration’s policies also played a leading
role in the war between the United States and Vietnam that played out in the 1960s.
Earlier in his first term, Eisenhower formed a Special Committee on Indochina. Their
recommendations in the region were finally formulated in the beginning of March 1954. In order
to achieve its goal of an anticommunist region in Southeast Asia, the United States would have
to do several things. Firstly, they must convince the populations of the individual nations that
communism would not help them achieve their nationalist aspirations. The Free World
ideologies, on the other hand, would be better options for eventual self-determination. The
United States would also have to contribute more funds to the region and possibly increase the
number of American personnel there. To accomplish victory against the communists, Bao Dai
had to be strengthened, and the Vietnamese Army also had to be bolstered. Finally, the
committee advocated for the implementation of an American psychological warfare program in
Indochina to convince the people that the Free World supported their national aspirations. This
included the distribution of fabricated propaganda as well as the construction of fake
demonstrations against the opposition.115 The Special Committee recommendations, though
offering this new psychological warfare program, amounted to more of the same overall.
Increases in aid and American personnel had been occurring throughout Truman and
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Eisenhower’s administrations. Also, American and French officials both had attempted to
strengthen Bao Dai, but he continued to place his personal interests above national interests.
Finally, the committee did not take the immense influence of Ho Chi Minh into account. Seen as
the leader of the nation by the grand majority of Vietnamese people, the nationalist bloc chiefly
supported him, but if he were forced to lean one way or the other, he would go with the
communists rather than the Free World. The Free World had established colonialism over the
nation and its neighbors for decades. Though the Special Committee’s recommendations would
eventually be implemented after Geneva, the static nature of the recommendations remained a
fact. Undeniably, American involvement increased from Truman to Eisenhower, but the overall
policy trend remained the same, involving as few American forces as possible while paying
almost the entire bill for French ground troops. This was all done to halt communism, when, in
reality, the Vietnamese only wanted independence.
Just as the Special Committee’s report became available, the complete downfall of the
French at Dien Bien Phu became a reality. Strong points began to fall one after the other, and
casualties were high on both sides. The French were surrounded, so both the Americans and the
French analyzed the implications of a defeat at Dien Bien Phu. For the French public, Dien Bien
Phu had symbolic value in terms of garnering great respect for French fighting forces. It also
possessed practical implications, for “probably if Dien Bien Phu falls, the government will be
taken over by defeatists.”116 The defeatists would then be exceedingly likely to favor a
withdrawal strategy and negotiate with the Viet Minh. A loss at Dien Bien Phu would also cause
fear amongst non-communist Vietnamese, for they would be afraid of all-out communist
takeover. The Viet Minh, however, would feel great pride, and Asiatic people as a whole would
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be proud to have proven their bravery against whites of the Western powers.
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Ultimately,

losing Dien Bien Phu had great implications on United States policy and on the impending
conferences at Geneva.
Dulles believed the principle of united action was utterly essential to confront the
growing defeatist sentiments. He started to formulate his first ideas for what would become
SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). Mostly, he sought a regional grouping of nations
that would support United States action in Indochina. He knew “that there appeared to be no
chance of keeping the French fighting in Indochina unless they know that the British and the
United States were going to be in their with them.”118 Dien Bien Phu had made United States
involvement with ground forces a necessity to save the region from communist domination. The
United States, however, was unwilling to act alone in the region and particularly wanted support
from the British and French. The opinion enforced again and again by British Foreign Minister
Anthony Eden clearly indicated that the British were not willing to fight in Indochina. He
“expressed to [Dulles] grave doubts that Britain would cooperate in any active fighting to save
Indochina.”119 They were most worried about its implications on British public opinion. Seeing
the financial drain Indochina put upon the French for the past several years, the British public
would certainly be unwilling to get involved in another ground war. The French, however,
pushed for American troops in order to save Dien Bien Phu. Dulles admitted that the French
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could not continue without assistance from United States and Britain, but he was not willing to
commit Americans to the fight unless British accompaniment could be assured, for Eisenhower
emphasized how “we must have collective security or we’ll fall.”120 If the British had agreed to
intervene, the President would have gone to Congress with a proposal for joint intervention.
British reservations, however, prevented this shift in policy.121
A great rift formed between the United States and Great Britain on the question of
Indochinese intervention. The United States wanted to intervene collectively at Dien Bien Phu to
prevent its fall, but the British were unwilling, for Churchill wrote to the United States that “Her
Majesty’s Government are not prepared to give any undertakings about UK mil[sic] action in
Indo-China in advance of the results at Geneva.”122 At Geneva, with all the powers working
together, the British sought to avoid intervention altogether. The United States saw their
unwillingness as “on a very narrow basis strictly in terms of local UK interest without regard to
other areas of the Far East such as Japan.”123 Clearly, a rift had formed. The United States saw
themselves as preserving the interests of the Free World, while they saw the United Kingdom as
preserving only their own national interests. The United States thus entered the Geneva
conference standing quite alone in its views. The British did not want to get involved in the
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region, and the French wanted to withdraw after a long struggle ending in defeat. This United
States’ singularity increased with time, as the other powers worked together to create a favorable
settlement to which only the United States refused to agree.
At Geneva, the Korean settlement was solved quite quickly, especially in comparison to
the Indochina question, which will be the focus here. At the start of the Indochina conference,
each nation’s role became clear. The British emphasized how they would support the French in
the event that a satisfactory settlement was formulated. The French were still struggling at Dien
Bien Phu, and their defeat remained imminent. In the event of this loss, the French government
would almost certainly change toward a policy more oriented toward complete withdrawal from
the region. The Soviets and the Chinese hinted that American intervention in the region would
prompt Chinese intervention, resulting in a total war between communism and capitalism. The
United States, however, remained committed to a regional grouping “for the defense of
Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in that
area.”124 The regional grouping was essential to any further United States intervention; they were
still unwilling to act alone.125 Eisenhower particularly emphasized this view in his private
memoirs on the recent National Security Council Meeting:
If the United States were, unilaterally, to permit its forces to be drawn into
conflict in Indochina and in a succession of Asian wars, the result would be to
drain off our resources and to weaken our over-all defensive position. If we,
without allies, should ever find ourselves fighting at various places all over the
region, and if Red Chinese aggressive participation were clearly identified, then
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we could scarcely avoid, I said, considering the necessity of striking directly at
the head instead of the tail of the snake, Red China itself.126
Clearly, Eisenhower wanted to avoid total war with China, especially since both countries
possessed nuclear weapons that could effectively destroy one another. He, like most of his other
advisors, favored united action rather than unilateral American action against the Viet Minh,
which would effectively be viewed as a strike against the Chinese.
The United States effectively wanted to continue the war in Indochina. They knew the
French would withdraw as soon as possible with their imminent defeat at Dien Bien Phu, so they
committed themselves to pressuring the French as much as possible to remain in the region. If
this could not be accomplished, however, they knew the United States and its allies would have
to become involved in the region with combat troops. The United States was fearful of a
communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia beginning with Vietnam. 127
The Chinese views on the situation were, according to Chinese Delegation papers for the
Geneva Conference, quite similar to those of the other nations involved, besides the United
States. They argued in favor of foreign military withdrawal from the region after a certain period
of time, as well as general elections in each nation to promote independent governments
determined by the people themselves. They even advocated for “economic, cultural, and
technological cooperation [of the three nations] with France for the purpose of developing the
economic and cultural relations.”128 The level of commitment to such a policy by the Chinese
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remained questionable, but the significance of the document has continued importance. Even the
Chinese, a people the United States refused to communicate with directly, seemed willing to
allow the people of Southeast Asia to determine their own destiny. This could have been because
they were confident the Vietnamese, especially, would orient themselves toward communism;
one must keep in mind that Ho Chi Minh had his own intentions in the region and was not
completely directed by the Chinese or the Soviet. In fact, Truman admitted Ho’s nationalist ties,.
Early in 1946, Ho had actually written to Truman asking for “The American people to interfere
urgently in support of our independence.”129 The willingness of the United States to grant such a
right to the people of Southeast Asia obviously remained dubious.
While Secretary of State Dulles was in Geneva working at the conference, the United
States Congress discussed the implications of the Indochinese situation. Senators from both the
Republican and Democratic parties expressed their support for united action and urged the allies
of the United States to participate. As New York Times writer William S. White noted, “The
Senate’s entire discussion of an hour and a half brought only a single outright expression of
opposition to any and all circumstances to the intervention of United States troops in IndoChina.”130 This opposition came from Republican Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, who
argued that American troops were not needed in the region. His peers refuted this continually; for
instance, Senator John F. Kennedy emphasized that “the United States and other nations may

%20(Indochina)%20War(s)>.
129

Ho Chi Minh, "Letter from Ho Chi Minh to President Truman, 02/28/1946," National
Archives. Available from http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/index.html?doddate=228. Internet; accessed 1 December 2010.
130

William S. White, “Senate Weighs Indo-China; Bipartisan Stand Shapes Up,” New
York Times, April 7, 1954, 1.

56

properly be called upon to play their fullest part.”131 Collective security was clearly necessary
before United States troops could intervene.
The differences between America’s objectives and the objectives of other Free World
nations would eventually doom the success of the conference. As the United States feared, Dien
Bien Phu fell on 7 May 1954. The fall was a direct hit to the old tradition of the colonial empire
of France and posed a challenge to the current government of Prime Minister Joseph Laniel, an
opponent of the withdrawal psychology.132 Unfortunately for the United States, though, on June
19, 1954, Pierre Mendes-France took office as Prime Minister of France after Laniel’s
resignation. Mendes-France had been opposed to French involvement in Indochina since 1950
and had always argued for negotiations with the Viet Minh. His focus at Geneva thus rejected
united action and favored the best compromise to ensure French withdrawal from the region.133
The ascension of Mendes-France to power in France marked a transformation in French policy.
Though voices like Mendes-France’s had been present in France and elsewhere throughout the
1950s, with Mendes-France in power, these voices were able to triumph. Unlike the United
States, for example, France was willing to talk directly with the Chinese. On 17 July 1954,
Mendes-France met with Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, and overall, they seemed to
agree on the necessary negotiations needed in the region. Enlai emphasizes how the Chinese
“hoped to see the expansion of a peaceful region,” and Mendes-France agreed completely.134
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This trend of agreement would continue in the next few days, when the accords from the
conference were announced and signed by the majority of conference participants.
On 21 July 1954, the Final Declaration at Geneva was issued. According to the accords,
hostilities in the region would cease, and foreign troops could not intervene. The nonintervention
of foreign troops also included a prohibition of military bases in the region. Additionally, in two
years time, in July 1956, free elections by secret ballot would take place in Vietnam and would
be supervised by an international commission. The inhabitants of Vietnam, who would be
divided by a demarcation line at the seventeenth parallel, were free to choose in which region
they wanted to live. The issue of partition was very important at the conference. It was decided
upon in lieu of some support for an enclave system, carving out certain areas of French and
Vietnamese control, respectively. The enclave system, however, was viewed as a remnant of
French colonialism, so it was eventually rejected.135 French withdrawal was also placed on a
timeline. Ultimately, the accords respected the eventual complete sovereignty of Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos over foreign interference. All the nations at the conference except the
United States signed these agreements. Instead, the American delegation “takes note” of the
declaration.136 Soon after the declaration was issued, they announced their views: “We share the
hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in full
independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples
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of that area to determine their own future.”137 One would then be prompted to ask why the
United States did not sign the declaration if these were truly their views. Ultimately, the United
States was confident that elections in the region would result in a communist victory,
proclaiming how “if the elections were held at present, Viet Minh would win it.”138 Signing the
accords meant that they could intervene neither in these elections nor in any other internal
matters in the country. By not signing, the United States felt that they were not bound to the
accords. Essentially, the dual crusade against both communist control of the region and
American intervention had ended in failure.
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Conclusions
American policy-makers of the 1950s could not relinquish their crusade against
communism, even if it meant challenging the self-determination of foreign peoples. After the
announcement of the Geneva accords, the United States began to enter Indochina unilaterally and
would undermine the Geneva agreements again and again in both words and actions. Geneva
also marked the end of the United States’ struggle to avoid intervention in the region while
simultaneously preventing the region from succumbing to communist control.
The era after World War II inaugurated a period of fear in the United States. This fear
was a fear of communist domination and capitalist defeat. From Europe to Asia, the United
States did all it could to stop the spread of communism. In this struggle, they often neglected the
self-determination and sovereignty of the affected populations. The nations of Southeast Asia,
and particularly Vietnam, were such victims. In their struggle for independence, the Vietnamese
rallied behind Ho Chi Minh. He was their nationalist and symbolic leader, technically supported
by the communists but also retaining his own agenda. Ho Chi Minh saw his nation’s best chance
for independence in the communist camp. The Free World did not offer such an opportunity.
Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations did not take these factors into account, for they
only concerned themselves with aiding the French in hopes of a communist defeat. The
communists in Vietnam, however, were ultimately more nationalistic than anything else. Their
chief goal was not to be a satellite of the either the Soviets or the Chinese; it was sovereignty.
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As aid continued throughout the transition from Truman to Eisenhower, it became clear
that the United States was not going to halt the rising communist tide. At the same time, the
country was unwilling to involve American troops in the region. In lieu of ground troops, the
United States sent in equipment, supplies, funds, and technical assistance, but all these efforts to
help the French retain Indochina had failed. At Geneva, then, the United States began its
unilateral campaign against self-determination in Vietnam. This would only be expanded with
time, and the Americans finally realized that in order to prevent Ho Chi Minh’s victory, they
would have to involve their own troops in the region. Had the United States signed the accords at
Geneva, its eventual violations of the agreements would have been challenged; but in abstaining,
they were essentially not bound to them. Continuing the trends began by the Truman
administration, the United States, under Eisenhower, abandoned the opinions of its allies and
subsequently began to act independently in the region. The quagmire of United States
intervention did not start after Geneva but actually began with the Truman administration;
involvement would only further expand under Eisenhower and future presidents.
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